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 Once and Future Nudges 
Arden Rowell* 
ABSTRACT 
The nudge – a form of behaviorally-informed regulation that at-
tempts to account for people’s scarce cognitive resources – has been 
explosively successful at colonizing the regulatory state.  This Essay 
argues that the remarkable success of nudges as a species creates new 
challenges and opportunities for individual nudges that did not exist ten 
years ago, when nudges were new.  These changes follow from the new 
fact that nudges must now interact with other nudges.  This creates op-
portunities for nudge versus nudge battles, where nudges compete with 
other nudges for the scarce resource of public cognition; and for nudge 
& nudge symbiosis, where nudges work complementarily with other 
nudges to achieve greater good with fewer resources.  Because of the 
potential for positive and negative interactions with other nudges, mod-
ern nudges should be expected to operate differently from ancestral 
nudges in important ways, and future nudges should be expected to op-
erate more differently still. Policymakers should prepare to manage fu-
ture positive and negative nudge-nudge interactions. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The nudge has successfully colonized the regulatory state.1  The success 
of nudges has, in turn, changed the regulatory ecosystem in which individual 
nudges operate. 
To see how the world has changed, consider the environment of the pri-
mordial nudge.  To succeed – to be adopted as a mechanism for government 
action – early nudges had to outcompete existing regulatory mechanisms.  
Those existing mechanisms – command and control, pure market mechanisms, 
 
* Professor and University Scholar, University of Illinois College of Law.  
 1. Consider, for example, the formal executive adoption under President Obama 
of behavioral science methods for establishing and evaluating regulatory policies.  
Exec. Order No. 13,707, Fed. Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 15, 2015) (establishing policies to 
recruit behavioral science experts; to strengthen agency relationships with research 
communities; to develop behaviorally-based strategies for applying behavioral science; 
and to “identify policies, programs, and operations where applying behavioral science 
insights may yield substantial improvements in public welfare, program outcomes, and 
program cost effectiveness”); see also Press Release, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PRESS 
SEC’Y, Fact Sheet: New Progress on Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve 
the American People (Sept. 15, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2016/09/15/fact-sheet-new-progress-using-behavioral-science-insights-
better-serve (presenting over forty applications of behavioral science to regulatory pol-
icy in a single year). 
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basic disclosure, etc. – had already carved ecological niches for themselves.  
As entrenched species, these other mechanisms initially had an advantage over 
the newcomer nudges.  Policymakers and stakeholders knew about these older 
mechanisms, had tested their legal and political welcome, and in many cases, 
statutes and regulations had already been specifically crafted to be hospitable 
to them. 
As a practical matter, this meant that adoption of early nudges was rela-
tively costly for policymakers.  Not only did policymakers have to know of the 
nudge to begin with, but they also had startup costs in ensuring that nudges 
could be used in a way that was legally permissible and politically and practi-
cally feasible.  As the new kid on the block, these early nudges had much to 
prove to gain acceptance and to carve a place for themselves. 
This early environment was not all bad for primordial nudges.  True, each 
nudge had to compete with other entrenched types of government action.  But 
structural advantages that nudges hold versus those other mechanisms – includ-
ing administrability benefits,2 welfare benefits,3 cost-effectiveness4 and auton-
omy benefits5 – often stood the nudge in good stead.  When a nudge competed 
with other (even entrenched) regulatory species – that is, when policymakers 
were introduced to the option of using nudges as alternatives to other forms of 
government action – the nudge often prevailed. 
One way to understand the explosion of the nudge population, then, is 
that the competitive advantage nudges offered in many regulatory contexts al-
lowed nudges to outcompete other mechanisms and led to increasing numbers 
 
 2. For an argument that nudges simplify regulation, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013). 
 3. For an updated and careful argument that nudges are often superior to other 
mechanisms – and particularly to mandates and bans – specifically on welfare grounds, 
see Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges vs. Shoves, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 210 (2014). 
 4. See Shlomo Benartzi, John Beshears, Katherine L. Milkman, Cass Sunstein, 
Richard H. Thaler, Maya Shankar, Will Tucker-Ray, William J. Congdon & Steven 
Galing, Should Governments Invest More in Nudging?, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1041, 1044–
51 (2017) (finding that, across many policy domains, nudges are more cost-effective 
than traditional policy interventions). 
 5. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003) (arguing, in an initial presentation of 
nudges, that nudges are desirable policy mechanisms in part because they preserve free-
dom of choice).  For an evaluation of the value of autonomy, see Björn Bartling, Ernst 
Fehr & Holger Herz, The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights (CESifo Working Paper 
No. 4252, 2013).  Note that not everyone thinks that nudges (always) improve auton-
omy.  See RICCARDO REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF 
LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 84–86 (2012). And others question the value of freedom 
of choice as a measure of policy success.  See SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: 
JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 16–46 (2013); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, 
How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1609–
10, 1628–30 (2014). 
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of nudges.6  As a species, the nudge was successful at replicating itself and at 
finding an ecological niche within the regulatory ecosystem.  In this sense, the 
captive breeding program that Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler developed to 
engineer and breed nudges and release them into the wild7 has been extraordi-
narily effective. 
And yet the very success that has led to Symposia like this one has also 
changed the regulatory ecosystem in which nudges now operate.  Not only 
must modern and future nudges compete with traditional tools of regulatory 
intervention like mandates and bans, they must also interact successfully with 
other nudges.  And as the nudge population continues to grow, strategic poli-
cymakers now need to consider how the size of the population is likely to affect 
the experience of individual organisms. 
This consideration should address at least two aspects of nudges’ evolu-
tionary ecology.  First, policymakers should develop observational methods for 
identifying and classifying possible nudge-nudge interactions.  These observa-
tions can then form the groundwork for evaluating when and how nudges can 
be expected to interact with one another.  Second, policymakers should con-
sider the institutional tools available for managing the nudge population and 
for structuring potential interactions between and among nudges.  The remain-
der of this Essay provides starting points for each of these analyses. 
II.  RECOGNIZING NUDGE-NUDGE INTERACTIONS 
Early nudges were generally justified by reference to their superiority (at 
least in some circumstances) to entrenched regulatory tools, including man-
dates, pure market mechanisms, and (non-behaviorally-informed) disclosure.8  
Initial arguments for nudges were thus arguments about the regulatory fitness 
of nudges in comparison to other mechanisms.9 
When nudges were rare, this initial focus on how nudges would compete 
with other regulatory species was entirely reasonable.  The mechanism of 
nudging is based on the fundamental insight that people have scarce cognitive 
 
 6. For a partial compendium of the many nudges that have been adopted over the 
past decade, see Mark Egan, Nudge Database v1.2, STIRLING BEHAV. SCI. CTR., 
https://www.stir.ac.uk/media/schools/management/documents/econom-
ics/Nudge%20Database%201.2.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2017) (chronicling over a 
hundred examples of international nudge use across more than ten areas of policy), and 
Press Release, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PRESS SEC’Y, supra note 1 (presenting over 
forty applications of behavioral science to regulatory policy in a single year). 
 7. By this I mean that the development of libertarian paternalism and the industry 
of nudge-making has been highly influential.  See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 
(2008); Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 5. 
 8. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 5. 
 9. Id.  Later justifications have also focused on comparative benefits.  See, e.g., 
Sunstein, supra note 3; Cass R. Sunstein, Nudging and Choice Architecture: Ethical 
Considerations, YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming). 
3
Rowell: Once and Future Nudges
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
712 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
resources.10  Why spend policymakers’ and scholars’ scarce resources address-
ing nudge-nudge interactions when a nudge might spend its whole life never 
meeting another of its kind?  Yet as nudges continue to propagate, policymak-
ers face a different landscape. 
In natural populations of organisms, successful population growth of this 
type has predictable implications.  In particular, when natural species become 
established, individual organisms often compete with other similar organisms 
for scarce resources. Worrisomely, this type of inter-species competition can 
lead to costly and socially inefficient investments that only capture a marginal 
benefit for individual organisms.  The classic example of this – an example that 
troubled a young Charles Darwin – is the showy, even over-elaborate tail of 
the male peacock.  Darwin puzzled over peacocks for some years, as he (and 
critics) saw them as a challenge to the mechanism of natural selection, whereby 
organisms inherit traits that are differentially fit for their environment.  (At one 
point, an exasperated Darwin apparently wrote to a friend that “[t]he sight of a 
feather in a peacock’s tail, whenever I gaze at it, makes me sick!”11) Eventually 
Darwin realized that apparently maladaptive traits – like peacock tails – could 
actually confer a reproductive advantage when organisms were required to 
compete with others of their own kind.  The result was his exhaustively speci-
fied theory of sexual selection, to which he devoted over half of his late-career 
book, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex.12 
Modern resource economists have reaffirmed that costly sexual selection 
of this type tends to evolve where species compete with other members of their 
own species.13  In such circumstances, sexual selection works like an arms race, 
 
 10. See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO 
LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH (2013); George Loewenstein, Cass R. Sunstein & Russell 
Golman, Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 391, 398–
400 (2014). 
 11. 8 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CHARLES DARWIN 40 (Frederick Burkhardt et al. 
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (1860) (letter to Asa Gray dated Apr. 3, 1860). 
 12. See CHARLES DARWIN, On the Origin of Species, in  ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 
BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION 90, 90–398 (Joseph Carroll ed., Broadview Texts 
2003) (1859) (proposing sexual selection as a possible mechanism for explaining why 
apparently maladaptive traits might reproduce); 2 CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF 
MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX (Paul H Barrett & R. B. Freeman eds., 
N.Y.U. Press 1989) (1871) (specifying the mechanism of sexual selection and provid-
ing evidence for sexual selection in nature).  For an entertaining overview of the science 
of sexual selection in peacocks, see Rachel E. Gross, A Peacock Must Be More Than 
Glorious, SLATE (Aug. 17, 2015, 9:40 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/wild_things/2015/08/17/peacock_evolution_through_sex-
ual_selection_feathers_sounds_eye_tracking.html. 
 13. See Michael T. Ghiselin, What is Sexual Selection? A Rent-seeking Approach, 
18 J. BIOECONOMICS 153, 154–55 (2016) (summarizing the different roles of natural, 
artificial, and sexual selection in Darwin’s theoretical system of evolution; describing 
how sexual selection relates to the economic theory of rent-seeking; and arguing that 
“[c]learly, what is advantageous to certain individuals is not always advantageous to 
the wholes of which they are parts.  This is true of both natural economies and political 
4
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as individual organisms invest in energy-draining or risk-creating strategies 
that do not benefit the species as a whole.  Peacocks, for instance, might actu-
ally do better as a species if they were better-camouflaged from predators.  Yet 
research with eye-tracking cameras has confirmed that female peahens do in-
deed spend more time looking at “showy” male peacocks,14 meaning that indi-
vidual peacocks still enjoy a comparative advantage in reproducing their genes 
if they have the plumage that attracts potential mates.  Thus, mechanisms that 
improve the fitness of individual organisms do not necessarily improve the fit-
ness for the species as a whole. 
Only safely-entrenched species can afford to spend resources on highly 
distinctive species-specific sex selection.  By contrast, when an organism must 
compete with other species for scarce resources, organisms can ill afford costly 
investments– like showy plumage, elaborate nests, or enormous racks of ant-
lers – that will help it (if at all) only in attracting mates of the same species.  
Other species that develop environment-specific adaptations, or which can 
spend their energy on food rather than display, will have too much of a com-
parative advantage.  Under conditions of inter-species competition, then, natu-
ral selection – selection driven by the environment in which species live – is 
likely to drive organisms’ success. 
What do intra-species competitions in natural species have to do with 
evaluating nudges?  At least two things.  First, the comparison can highlight 
the importance of increasing resource demand.  If – because of the success of 
nudges – we now live in a system of increasing population of both nudges and 
nudgers, we should be alert to the possibility that nudge(r)s will face increasing 
competition from other nudge(r)s and that individual responses may not be so-
cially optimal.  In fact – as with peacock plumage – as nudges face increasing 
competition intra-species instead of cross-species, there is an increasing dan-
ger of nudge “arms races.”  The more successful nudges become as compared 
to competitor species, the more we might want to be alert to the corollary to 
sexual selection in nudges: selection that is driven by intra-nudge competition 
rather than by optimal (or even efficient) resource investment. 
Second, the comparison to biological competitions can help to illuminate 
what happens in competitive environments where resources are scarce.  Recall 
that a foundational insight of behaviorally informed regulation is that people’s 
cognitive resources (attention, processing, etc.) are bounded, and therefore 
scarce.15  Agencies – the source of most government nudges – are statutorily 
required to establish policies in furtherance of particular goals.  Statutes are 
mostly drafted in isolation from one another, without relative prioritization.  If 
we conceive of the public’s attention as the scarce resource for which agencies  
economies.”); cf. Gordon Tullock, Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 
W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (presenting the economic concept of “rent-seeking”). 
 14. See Greg Miller, Eye-Tracking Cameras Reveal Secrets of Peacock’s Tail 
Feathers, WIRED (July 26, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/peacock-eye-tracking 
(citing Jessica Yorzinski et al., Through Their Eyes: Selective Attention in Peahens 
During Courtship, 216 J. EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY 3035 (2013)). 
 15. See supra note 1. 
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are often competing, many statutory directives implicate potential competition 
– and the competition for that resource may therefore be illuminated by evalu-
ating biological competitions for scarce resources. 
III.  AN EXAMPLE OF NUDGE-NUDGE INTERACTIONS: THE 
MONRONEY STICKER 
Thus far the analysis has been theoretical.  To illuminate real-world prob-
lems, it might be helpful to evaluate an example of where agency nudges inter-
act with other agency nudges.  In what kind of landscape might we expect 
nudge-nudge interaction? 
Much might (and perhaps should) be written in answer to this question.  
As a starting point, however, it may be reasonable to think that nudge-nudge 
interactions are most likely to occur where there are multiple potential policy 
goals that underlie a single consumer choice, and where there are multiple 
agencies who administer differing statutory requirements to try to shape public 
behavior regarding that choice.  Such contexts provide fertile ground for 
nudges and thus (perhaps) present a greater chance of fostering nudge-nudge 
interactions. 
One example of such a policy space is the purchase of a car.  Car purchas-
ing has been subject to a variety of statutory disclosure requirements since the 
passage of the Automobile Information Disclosure Act of 1958, which required 
so-called “Monroney stickers” – the familiar labels affixed to the windows of 
new automobiles.16 
 
 16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1231–1233 (2012).  The labels are called the “Monroney sticker” 
after Almer Stillwell “Mike” Monroney, the Oklahoma Senator who sponsored the dis-
closure act.  Robert Peele, The Senator Behind the Window Sticker, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/automobiles/04MONRONEY.html. 
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Figure 1: Original Monroney sticker for the 1971 American Motors Corporation Grem-
lin 2-door Sedan, disclosing the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (“MSRP”) of 
$1999.00 and identifying the optional and included features.17  Notably missing is any 
treatment of the car’s safety or fuel efficiency. 
 
 
Early Monroney sticker disclosures might strike modern car buyers as 
minimal; they provided little more than the make, model, and serial number; 
 
 17. Christopher Ziemnowicz, 1971 AMC Gremlin AMO 2015 Show – All Original 
60f6.jpg, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (July 25 2015), https://commons.wiki-
media.org/wiki/File:1971_AMC_Gremlin_AMO_2015_show_-_all_original_6of6.jpg 
(license available at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
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the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (“MSRP”); and the standard and op-
tional features.18  Yet even this was critical information in a car-buying market 
that had been rife with questionable sales practices.19  In such a market, the 
mere introduction of a standardized list of features and a disclosure of the rec-
ommended price was enough to substantially change the context in which car-
purchasers made their decisions.  With that in mind, the initial policy goal of 
the Monroney sticker – to inform consumers of the key features in the car they 
were purchasing – was substantially satisfied by the inclusion of a disclosure 
of the features that were then understood to be most relevant to car purchases 
(such as the size of the engine and the type of transmission). 
Over the past decade, the introduction of behaviorally and psychologi-
cally informed regulatory tools has revolutionized the way that disclosure is 
structured.20 During the same period, common understanding of the important 
features that purchasers need to know about the cars they are purchasing has 
evolved as well, and the information required on the Monroney sticker has 
mushroomed.  Nowadays, in addition to the information previously required, 
all new cars must also show two additional important forms of disclosure: 
safety disclosures about how the car performs in crash tests (administered by 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”))21 and fuel effi-
ciency disclosures about how the car uses fuel (administered by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the Department of Transportation 
(“DoT”)).22  As a result, the modern Monroney sticker incorporates several 
different types of disclosure, with each type focused on a different, potentially 
important feature of the car. 
Specific safety ratings have been required since 2007.23  In its rule on 
Vehicle Labeling of Safety Rating Information, NHTSA included a series of 
 
 18. The earliest labels also included the vehicle’s final assembly point, dealer des-
tination, and the method and cost of transportation to the dealership.  Peele, supra note 
16. 
 19. Monroney’s own justifications for proposing the bill centered on its impact on 
businesspeople rather than on consumer protection: “‘The dealer who is honest about 
the so-called “list price” cannot compete with the one who “packs” several hundred 
dollars extra into it so he can pretend to give you more on your trade-in,’ Monroney 
explained when he introduced the bill in March 1958.”  Peele, supra note 16. 
 20. See Loewenstein, Sunstein & Golman, supra note 10, at 392. 
 21. 49 C.F.R. § 575.301 (2013); Vehicle Labeling of Safety Rating Information, 
71 Fed. Reg. 53,572, 53,585 (Sept. 12, 2006) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 575.301) 
(requiring car manufacturers to include NHTSA’s New Car Assessment Program crash 
ratings on the Monroney sticker and explaining that including the information on the 
label “is intended to provide consumers with relevant information at the point of sale”). 
 22. See Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label; Final 
Rule, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-
2009-0865-7647 (last visited Aug. 22, 2017). 
 23. § 575.301. 
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requirements regarding the information on and format of the safety label, in-
cluding the label’s border,24 size and legibility,25 heading area,26 the order of 
the crash results listed,27 and the specific image of a star to be used to indicate 
rankings.28  In many cases the directions, particularly about font and legibility, 
are quite precise.29  Importantly, the NHTSA regulations also include a mini-
mum size requirement for the safety label: 4.5 inches wide and 3.5 inches 
high,30 meaning that the safety label commands a minimum area of 15.75 
square inches. 
In 2007, Congress also required NHTSA, in consultation with the EPA 
and the Department of Energy (“DoE”), to establish regulations to implement 
new labeling requirements regarding fuel economy and emissions and to de-
velop a rating system to help consumers easily compare fuel economy.31  In 
2011, the requirement of disclosure was substantially revised by a joint regu-
lation issued by the EPA and NHTSA in a large behaviorally informed under-
taking that Cass Sunstein has lauded as a particularly successful nudge.32  The 
relevant rule, issued jointly by the two agencies, delineates the specifics of how 
the “Fuel economy and environment label” is to look on the Monroney 
sticker.33 
Like the safety label, the fuel economy and environment label regulations 
include a number of requirements.  For this label, these requirements were ex-
plicitly designed according to behavioral principles to increase the readability 
and salience of the label.34  These included not only font size and highlight 
 
 24. § 575.301(e)(1). 
 25. § 575.301(e)(2). 
 26. § 575.301(e)(3) (“The words ‘Government Safety Ratings’ must be in bold-
face, capital letters that are light in color and centered.  The background must be dark.”). 
 27. § 575.301(e)(4)–(6). 
 28. § 575.301(e)(7); § 575.301, fig.3. 
 29. See, e.g., § 575.301(e)(1) (“Safety Rating Label Border.  The safety rating la-
bel must be surrounded by a solid dark line that is a minimum of 3 points in width.”). 
 30. § 575.301, fig.1 (Sample Label for a Vehicle with At Least One NCAP Rat-
ing). 
 31. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 
105 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32908 (2012)); Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle 
Fuel Economy Label; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478 (July 6, 2011) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R., pts. 85, 86, and 600, 49 C.F.R. pt. 575). 
 32. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 81–89 (using car labeling as an example of 
successful behavioral intervention). 
 33. See 49 C.F.R. § 575.401 (2013); see also 40 C.F.R pts. 85, 86, 600. 
 34. Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. Reg. 
at 39,578; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 81–89. 
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color (blue)35 and other style requirements,36 but also a sophisticated set of in-
fographics that were intended to convey substantial quantities of information 
without much reading needed.37  Importantly, the requirements also identify 
the minimum label size: in this case, 4.5 inches high and 7 inches long, for a 
total area of 31.5 square inches.38  Note that this is twice the required area ded-
icated to the safety label (which is 15.75 square inches).39 
The resulting labels vary in substance somewhat, depending upon the spe-
cifics of the cars being sold, and retailers retain some discretion in how they 
organize the labels, subject to the regulatory requirements.  That said, the lay-
out of modern Monroney stickers is relatively standardized.  As a sample, con-
sider this modern sticker: 
Figure 2: Modern Monroney Sticker for a 2012 Chevrolet Volt, including the modern 
fuel efficiency and safety disclosures.40 
 
 35. See Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 39,498 (“The final label will use one color, blue, for all vehicles to highlight 
important aspects of the label.  The agencies chose not to use red as the primary color 
on the label due to the perceived “warning” message that it can convey.  Conversely, 
we decided not to use green on all of the labels because we did not want to imply that 
all vehicles are green (i.e. clean) vehicles.  The agencies were also advised that the 
color blue does not fade to a different color (green for example, can fade into yellow).”). 
 36. See id. at 39,498 (regulating use of color on Monroney stickers). 
 37. See id. at 39,570 (requiring display of Gas Guzzler Tax statement). 
 38. See id. at 39,578 (establishing size and legibility requirements for Monroney 
stickers). 
 39. See 49 C.F.R. § 575.301(e)(2) (2013). 
 40. Mario R. Durán Ortiz, 2012 Chevrolet Volt Window Sticker 01 2023 0483.jpg, 
WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (Jan. 27, 2012), https://commons.wiki-
media.org/wiki/File:2012_Chevrolet_Volt_window_sticker_01_2012_0483.jpg (li-
cense available at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en). 
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A review of the modern label helps illuminate several concepts.  First, the 
Monroney sticker as a whole contains a finite amount of physical space.  Just 
as consumers face a finite amount of cognitive space in their consideration of 
their car purchases, so the use of the physical space on the label is hydraulic: if 
a portion of the space is taken up for one purpose, it necessarily reduces the 
relative resources allocated to other purposes.  A literal (but, I think, still in-
formative) example of this is the physical space of the fuel economy and envi-
ronment sticker in comparison to the safety label.  These labels in aggregate 
are large enough to take up a good portion of the whole sticker; those portions 
of the label cannot then be allocated by the car retailer to other uses (e.g., to 
information about reliability), even if those uses were in fact helpful to a pur-
chaser.  Consumers’ scarce cognitive resources are thus channeled towards the 
larger, more-salient fuel economy portions of the label – and therefore chan-
neled away from the smaller, less-salient safety portions of the label. 
Of course, the fact that users face scarce cognitive resources is not news, 
and in some cases, nudges may even be able to help with this problem so that 
fewer total resources (in ink and in neurons) are required to effectively convey 
the relevant information.41  But another problem – and one that, thus far, has 
been neglected – is that there are two labels here, both of which are attempting 
to nudge consumers towards important (and statutorily architected) ends: to-
wards buying cars that are safer and towards buying cars that are more fuel 
efficient.  These labels – these nudges – necessarily interact with each other. 
And in the modern regulatory ecosystem – where nudges must increasingly 
live alongside other nudges – it is worth considering how such nudge-nudge 
interactions might impact both human behavior and the ability of nudges to be 
effective policy instruments. 
To see an example of how ignoring nudge-nudge interactions can impov-
erish analysis, consider the ways that multiple-nudge contexts like the Mon-
roney sticker offer opportunity for negative competitions: for nudge versus 
nudge battles that might serve neither nudge well and which even run the risk 
of wasting social resources.  At a basic level, because nudges operate on the 
assumption that humans have limited cognitive resources, they are always 
competing with one another to capture the cognitive resources needed to fur-
ther their ends.  In the case of the Monroney sticker, this theoretical competi-
tion is concretized by the physical real estate of the sticker.  Real estate – and 
attention – devoted to one label (and its attendant statutory goal) is not devoted 
to the other.  By this measure it is easy to see the winner of this nudge versus 
nudge battle: the fuel efficiency label “wins out” over the safety label by two 
to one (or more precisely, by 31.5 square inches to 15.75 square inches).  But 
we might also imagine more sophisticated measures, where we evaluate the 
impact of each label by quantifying attention, for example through the use of 
 
 41. See Loewenstein, Sunstein & Golman, supra note 10, at 405–12, for behav-
iorally-informed strategies to disclosure. 
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eye-tracking technology.42  As with female peahens, such technology might 
well reveal that it is the “showier” nudge that captures attention – and as with 
the drabber peacocks, drabber nudges may well suffer in comparison. 
Even more worryingly, where nudges must compete with one another to 
capture scarce resources, we might be concerned that the same dynamic could 
develop as where biological organisms compete with one another for the scarce 
resource of potential mates: that nudge versus nudge competitions could some-
times generate a phenomenon that looks much like rent-seeking, or like so-
cially-inefficient sexual selection.  As with the biological context, this could 
easily lead to overinvestment by individuals – or in individual nudges – at the 
expense of the welfare of the collective. 
The legal and practical implications of this phenomenon could be thorny.  
To see how this might play out in the concrete context of the Monroney sticker, 
consider the closest that the agencies in question came to recognizing a poten-
tial interaction between the two labels.  In the fuel efficiency label rule, the 
EPA and NHTSA say the following: 
 
to address concerns raised by some commenters that fuel economy rat-
ings overshadow safety ratings component [sic] of the Monroney label, 
NHTSA is planning to conduct comprehensive consumer research to 
develop revised safety ratings based on revisions to the fuel economy 
component of the label under this rule.  NHTSA will publish details of 
the consumer testing in a future Federal Register notice.43 
 
Suppose that NHTSA now reconsiders its safety label, in light of its possible 
overshadowing by the fuel efficiency label, and NHTSA determines – perhaps 
through quantitative methods such as eye tracking, perhaps through more qual-
itative methods such as surveys – that its safety label is in fact overshadowed 
by the fuel efficiency label.  NHTSA is statutorily directed to “reduce traffic 
accidents and deaths and injuries resulting from traffic accidents;”44 how might 
it do so?  One way might be by increasing the effectiveness of the safety nudge 
by capturing a greater portion of the scarce attention of car buyers at the point 
of purchase.  One easy option, then, would be for NHTSA to simply increase 
the size of its required label – say to twice the size of the fuel economy and 
environment label.  This would be crude but possibly effective. 
 
 42. Technology for quantifying relative attention exists already and is used in ap-
plications that range from biology (such as in evaluating peacock mating habits) to 
advertising.  See, e.g., ANDREW T. DUCHOWSKI, EYE TRACKING METHODOLOGY: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2003).  But so far as I am aware, it is not being used by agen-
cies to evaluate the relative effectiveness of their disclosures – and much less to evalu-
ate the relative effectiveness of their nudges versus other nudges. 
 43. Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. Reg. 
at 39,489. 
 44. 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (2012). 
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Another option would be to invest less in the physical space of the label 
and more in the label’s psychological showiness – like evolving brighter plum-
age rather than a larger tail.  For example, NHTSA could design a label that 
includes neon ink, eye-catching patterns, or a hologram depicting a crashing or 
mangled automobile.  Or it might do all of these, or invest in some other strat-
egy entirely: the point is that, to further its statutory purpose of reducing traffic 
accidents and injuries, NHTSA might reasonably understand itself to be obli-
gated to effectively increase the salience of its safety disclosure.  And in a 
world of multiple nudges – a world where consumers will view any safety label 
alongside the shiny and behaviorally informed fuel economy and environment 
label – NHTSA experiences different pressures than in the world it faced when 
it initially designed the safety label. 
Further worth noting is that the strength of NHTSA’s incentive has little 
if anything to do with the relative importance of this statutory goal versus an-
other – in this case, fuel efficiency versus crash safety.  As with the vast ma-
jority of statutes, neither statutory regime provides any information as to how 
it is that multiple statutory goals should be prioritized.  As a result, where there 
are nudge versus nudge interactions, there is a worrisome possibility that nudge 
versus nudge battles may result and that this could lead in some cases to over-
investment in nudges, as compared to the socially optimal level.  In some cir-
cumstances, the outcome could be a wasteful arms race, where agencies flip 
back and forth, competing for more and more salient and effective nudges. 
This is not to say that all nudge-nudge interactions are necessarily nega-
tive. In reality, interaction between two nudges is likely to be much more com-
plex.  Again considering the Monroney sticker, it seems plausible that the two 
labels might interact in friendly, as well as in competitive, ways. 
How might two nudges interact positively?  In at least two ways.  First, 
while one nudge might capture a greater share of the total attention allocated 
towards a decision (e.g., of which car to buy), some nudges may increase the 
overall size of the attention pie.  For example, if the large, effective fuel econ-
omy label draws more attention to the entire Monroney sticker, it might lead, 
in aggregate, to more attention to safety as well, compared to a world where 
there was no catchily-colored fuel economy label on the sticker.  The result 
might be a positive interaction for the purposes of the fuel-economy label, 
which otherwise – small and staid as it is – might struggle to capture much 
attention at all. 
Another possible positive interaction type would come where at least one 
nudge increased overall efficiency so much that it left surplus attention for 
other nudges to consume.  Suppose, for example, that consumers generally 
struggle to understand fuel economy information, and that because that topic 
area is difficult, they waste much of their energy and attention trying to calcu-
late total fuel cost and the practical impact of various mileage types.  If that 
were the case, an improvement to the fuel economy label that is successful at 
summarizing vast quantities of fuel use information would leave more time and 
cognitive space for consumers to reflect on safety.  This, too, might be a posi-
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tive interaction: it could mean that the safety label might actually be more ef-
fective in combination with the fuel efficiency label – in a multiple-nudge 
world – than it would be in a world where the safety label tried to make it on 
its own. 
In sum, there are multiple ways – both positive and negative – in which 
nudges may interact with one another.  The interaction of the modern fuel label 
and the older safety label thus provides an example of nudge-nudge interaction 
in the wild – and of the potential tensions that can arise in a regulatory land-
scape where there are multiple nudges in play.  When nudges interact with 
other nudges in an unregulated fashion, there is no guarantee that the final 
product will represent a socially optimal investment of resources, and there 
may be reason to worry that there can be overinvestment.  And importantly, 
the operation of each single nudge may be significantly affected by the exist-
ence and operation of other nudges. 
IV. UNREGULATED INTERACTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE 
Thus far, nudge-nudge interactions remain essentially unregulated; even 
the Obama-era executive order promoting behaviorally informed regulation 
failed to identify nudge-nudge interactions as a potentially relevant factor to 
consider in the issuance of a nudge.45  This is troublesome, as there is no inter-
nal reason that individual agencies should be expected to be good at determin-
ing the optimal balance of related policy goals.  Significantly more work is 
needed here.  In particular, it is important to identify the environmental condi-
tions that lead to nudge-nudge interactions.  Doing so may help inform where 
we should expect to see nudge-nudge interactions arise. 
Furthermore, when policymakers note the possibility of a nudge-nudge 
interaction, it would be helpful if they could also evaluate whether a nudge-
nudge interaction is likely to lead to complementarity or competition.  Yet thus 
far, there is vanishingly little research – and vanishingly few tools – to help in 
determining when interactions are likely to be positive and when they are likely 
to be negative.  Especially as the use of nudges continues to grow, it is increas-
ingly important that policymakers be presented with methods for predicting the 
types of impact that nudge-nudge interactions may have on final decision-mak-
ing. 
Which institutions are best-situated to respond to the scarcity of cognitive 
resources and to the interrelations between agencies’ behavioral interventions?  
The remainder of this section suggests that agencies – which administer decen-
tralized statutory mandates – are ill-suited to manage the issue on their own.  
Unfortunately, negative nudge-nudge interactions may be particularly perni-
cious because at least one set of institutional referees that might normally be 
expected to act as a check on agencies – courts – are also unlikely to be helpful 
in this context.  Congress could help in some circumstances by creating explicit 
legislative prioritizations, but such prioritizations would be politically costly 
 
 45. See Exec. Order No. 13,707, Fed. Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 15, 2015). 
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and could not in any case address all potential conflicts.  Centralized executive 
review thus emerges as the most promising candidate for immediate institu-
tional response to the puzzle of nudge-nudge interactions. 
A.  Institutional Limitations on Agencies, Courts, and Congress in 
Managing Nudge-Nudge Interactions 
On an optimistic, public-oriented theory of behavioral regulation, agen-
cies ought to help the public by architecting choices to increase the quality of 
individual decision-making.  This obviously requires some account of what it 
means to make good quality decisions; otherwise there would be no way to 
know which choices lead to better decisions and which to worse.  Where there 
is a single, informed, intelligent, public-oriented decision-maker, it is possible 
to identify a single account of what it means to make good decisions and to 
implement by encouraging choice architecture that furthers that account.  Un-
der such circumstances, the fact that people have scarce cognitive resources is 
simply a factor that plays in to effective choice architecture, and uses of those 
resources can be allocated according to the chosen model of good decision-
making. 
Unfortunately, most agencies administer statutes that Congress has 
drafted in isolation, with no clue as to how agency statutory priorities should 
relate to or be ranked against competing priorities from other statutes and other 
agencies.  Where those conflicts are purely intra-agency and not explicitly ad-
dressed by Congress, agencies are typically given significant discretion to set 
their own priorities.  But where those conflicts exist between multiple agencies, 
the situation is uneasy. 
In theory, Congress might solve the problem of regulatory competition 
for scarce behavioral resources by deciding resource allocation: by determining 
and articulating how various statutory priorities should be ranked against one 
another.  This would be a burdensome task, and an extremely politically costly 
one, as it would require rank-ordering of priorities.  Nevertheless, Congress 
might still consider making some explicit judgments about how to compara-
tively rank the significance of the most important issues and/or the issues most 
likely to come into conflict with alternative administrative mandates.  
One promising category for Congress to consider making prioritizations 
explicit is the set of statutory delegations that already ask multiple agencies to 
cooperate in managing a single regulatory task.  In such contexts, the agencies 
may be particularly likely to face direct competition for behavioral resources, 
which Congress might mitigate by making its prioritizations explicit.  This 
could be particularly helpful in circumstances where agencies already share 
statutory responsibilities.  Labeling requirements in particular often implicate 
requirements from multiple agencies, as discussed above for the Monroney 
sticker.  But while these multiple-agency contexts provide strong opportunities 
for Congress to clarify priorities, the political economy of sorting out such pri-
oritizations is likely to remain extremely costly.  Congress is therefore unlikely 
to work as an effective primary manager of potential nudge-nudge interactions. 
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Unfortunately, courts also face institutional limitations that make them 
unlikely actors in managing nudge-nudge interactions.  This is for two reasons: 
first, because of their reluctance to prioritize among statutory regimes; and sec-
ond, because of their hesitancy to determine internal agency organization. 
The first reason courts are likely to be ineffective in managing cross-
agency conflicts is that, institutionally, they are not well-suited to balance the 
relative importance of competing statutory claims.  To resolve these disputes, 
courts will need not only to understand the relatively technical nature of agency 
interventions chosen and their likely effect but also to prioritize between dif-
ferent statutory regimes.  Courts may be reasonably leery of engaging in this 
sort of weighing. 
The second reason courts are likely to struggle to address nudge-nudge 
interactions relates to courts’ traditional reluctance to interfere in matters of 
internal agency organization, including staffing decisions.46  Courts only re-
view “final agency action,”47 and decisions about internal organization are typ-
ically viewed as interlocutory and best left to the executive and to the agency 
itself.48  Furthermore, by statute, agency organizational decisions are exempt 
from public notice and comment procedures.49  This means both that an 
agency’s decisions to “ramp up” internal investments in behavioral resources 
are not likely to be publicly analyzed and that such decisions will generally 
lack any record robust enough to support judicial review (under, e.g., arbitrary 
and capricious review),50 even where agency action might be characterized as 
final.  Particularly insofar as much of the behavioral arms race plays out in 
internal agency decisions to staff behavioral researchers – and insofar as, at 
some point, that investment will become socially inefficient – courts, like Con-
gress, are unlikely to play an important role in checking agency overinvest-
ment, or in managing related nudge-nudge interactions. 
 
 46. Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1293, 1367 (2012) (characterizing courts as “reluctant” to police agency struc-
ture and organization). 
 47. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
 48. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 
1859–70 (2015) (describing how courts have hesitated to incorporate internal agency 
operation into most traditional doctrines concerning judicial oversight of agency action, 
including standing and nondelegation). 
 49. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012) (exempting rules of “agency organization, pro-
cedure, or practice” from Administrative Procedure Act notice and comment proce-
dures).  Note that even where agency rulemaking is subject to notice and comment, 
notice and comment procedures are unlikely to provide much if any tonic to the push 
towards a behavioral arms race, since rules are generally presented, as they are consid-
ered, in isolation rather than as part of a general scheme of attention/cognitive resource 
allocation. 
 50. See Jennifer Nou, Intra-agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 436–
37 (2015). 
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B. Opportunities for Executive Oversight of Nudge-Nudge Inter-
actions 
Limitations on internal agency management and on congressional and ju-
dicial oversight suggest that centralized executive oversight may play a partic-
ularly important role in managing nudge-nudge interactions.  Even then, how-
ever, strengthened executive oversight cannot address all possible interactions, 
and the current lack of treatment of appropriate nudge-nudge interaction policy 
would hobble even a highly behaviorally savvy executive office. 
One possibility would be for the President to attempt to respond to the 
expectation of nudge-nudge interactions by providing explicit centralized di-
rection about how to allocate competing claims on the public’s scarce cognitive 
resources.  Because these allocations are likely to be fact- and context-specific, 
such direction would most likely be ineffective if it were too generic.  More 
promising would be the strategy of leveraging existing executive institutions 
that centralize and coordinate agency oversight. 
The most promising of these – and the institution that may be most likely 
to have a salutary effect on limiting the impact of the behavioral arms race – is 
that of the centralized executive reviewer, a function that in the United States 
is served by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”).  A 
centralized reviewer within the executive branch may be helpful in limiting the 
impact of the arms race for at least two reasons. 
First, in the absence of specific (e.g., Congressional) direction on how to 
balance priorities as between multiple statutory goals, a centralized reviewer 
can opt for one allocation of cognitive resources over another.  This is a pow-
erful decision in the sense that it allows the reviewer to prioritize one set of 
policies over another, but even where the central reviewer fails to make optimal 
– or even preferred – policy prioritizations, the mere fact that final allocations 
of cognitive resources are at least partially determined by a third party may act 
as a salutary chill on agencies’ incentives to otherwise invest (too) heavily in 
behavioral resources. 
A second critical function served by the central reviewer is that of coor-
dination. Cass Sunstein, who was the head of OIRA under President Obama, 
has emphasized the centrality of coordination to the role of OIRA;51 a concern 
about nudge-nudge interactions suggests that there are important interrelation-
ships between the emergence of behavioral regulation and of a model of “OIRA 
as coordinator.”  The more behaviorally informed regulation becomes, the 
more agencies will be forced to recognize and respond to the fact that their 
ability to capture cognitive resources may interact with the ability of other 
agencies to do the same.  For some agencies and some decisions this may not 
matter, as where there may be few to no competing public choice architects or 
where Congress has been uncharacteristically clear about prioritization of re-
 
 51. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths 
and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1839 (2013). 
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sources.  But for the rest of the universe of cases, it will be increasingly im-
portant that there be a centralized body that can coordinate efforts and – hope-
fully – reduce any inefficient overinvestment in behavioral infrastructure.   
Such a goal would be a sound addendum to President Trump’s stated interest 
in “reducing the regulatory burdens placed on the American people,” a policy 
articulated, among other places, in his recent Executive Order on “Enforcing 
the Regulatory Reform Agenda.”52 
That said, even if OIRA could resolve all executive agency conflicts with 
its own scarce staffing resources, so long as the centralized reviewer is located 
within the executive branch, its authority over independent agencies will be 
sharply curtailed.  So, while OIRA might be able to mediate conflicts among 
executive agencies, it cannot manage competing behavioral market share with 
executive agencies.  As a result, even with a strong OIRA that is dedicated to 
cross-agency coordination, if nudge populations continue to increase, eventual 
interactions between executive and independent nudges will have no obvious 
referee to make sure that behavioral investments remain socially optimal. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Early nudges faced a different regulatory landscape than do modern 
nudges.  Once, nudges primarily faced competition from other forms of regu-
latory action, such as mandates and traditional economic mechanisms.  In the 
last decade, nudges often out-competed these other mechanisms, with the result 
that nudges have become a familiar part of the regulatory state.  Precisely be-
cause nudges have been so successful, however, they are now prone to interac-
tions with other nudges.  Future nudges should account not only for how the 
scarce cognitive resources of the public might be nudged in helpful ways, but 
also for how nudges can be expected to interact with one another.  Agencies, 
Congress, and courts all face institutional limitations in managing multiple 
nudges.  As a result, centralized executive review may provide the most natural 
home for managing nudge-nudge interactions. 
 
 
52. Press Release, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PRESS SEC’Y, Presidential Executive Order 
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